RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE-NONDISCRIMINATORY, FAIRLY APPORTIONED EXCISE TAX APPLIED TO
STEVEDORING COMPANIES LOADING AND UNLOADING GOODS IN IMPORTS AND EXPORT TRANSIT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN IMPORT OR
DUTY WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE.

In January 1975, respondents, the Association of Private
Stevedoring Companies' and the Washington Public Ports
Association, brought suit in Washington to have Revised Rule
193, Part D, Washington Administrative Code 458-20-193-D,
I Respondents

engaged in the stevedoring business, loading and unloading cargo from

ships at various ports in the State of Washington. The record of the case contained no succinct definition of the activities of a stevedoring business. Thus the Court, in a footnote,
cited the definition contained in a previous stevedoring case:
What was done by the appellant in the business of loading and unloading was not
prolonged beyond the stage of transportation and its reasonable incidents ....
True, the service did not begin or end at the ship's side, where the cargo is placed
upon a sling attached to the ships tackle. It took in the work of carriage to and
from the 'first place of rest,' which means that it covered the space between the
hold in the vessel and a convenient point of discharge on the dock .... The fact is
stipulated, however, that no matter by whom the work is done or paid for,
'stevedoring services are essential to waterborne commerce and always commence in the hold of the vessel and end at the "first place of rest," and vice versa.'
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90, 93 (1937). Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies 435 U.S. 734 (1977).
' Wash. Admin. Code 458-20-193D (Rule 193-Part D) TRANSPORTATION. COMMUNICATION,
PUBLIC UTILITY ACTIVITIES, OR OTHER SERVICES IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE.

In computing tax there may be deducted from gross income the amount thereof
derived as compensation for performance of services which in themselves constitute interstate or foreign commerce to the extent that a tax measured thereby
constitutes an impermissible burden upon such commerce. A tax does not constitute an impermissible burden upon interstate or foreign commerce unless the
tax discriminates against that commerce by placing a burden thereon that is not
borne by intrastate commerce, or unless the tax subjects the activity to the risk
or repeated exaction of the same nature from other states. Transporting across
the state's boundaries is exempt, whereas supplying such transporters with
facilities, arranging accomodation, providing funds and the like, by which they
engage in such commerce is taxable.
Examples of Exempt Income:
1. Income from those activities which consist of the actual transportation of persons or property across the state's boundaries is exempt.
Examples of Taxable Income:
3. Compensation received by contracting, stevedoring or loading companies for
services performed within this state is taxable.
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which applied the Washington Business and occupation tax8 to
stevedoring, held unconstitutional. The respondents alleged that
the levy as applied to stevedoring was violative of both the Commerce Clause4 and the Import-Export Clause' of the United States
Constitution, relying on the Stevedoring Cases6 previously decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Superior Court of
8 Wash. Rev. Code 82. 04.220:

There is levied and shall be collected from every person a tax for the act or
privilege of engaging in business activities. Such tax shall be measured by the application of rates against value of products, gross proceeds of sales or gross income of the business, as the case may be.
Wash. Rev. Code 82.04.290 in applicable part reads:
Upon every person engaging within this state in any business activity other than
or in addition to those enumerated in ...;as to such persons the amount of tax on
account of such activities shall be equal to the gross income of the business
multiplied by the rate of one percent. This section includes, among others, and
without limiting the scope hereof ... persons engaged in the business of tendering any type of service which does not constitute a "sale at retail" or a "sale at
wholesale .. "
Wash. Rev. Code 82.04.460 reads in applicable part:
Any person rendering services taxable under WRC 82.04.290 and maintaining
places of business both within and without this state which contribute to the rendition of such services shall, for the purpose of computing tax liability under
WRC 82.04.290, apportion to this state that portion of his gross income which is
derived from services rendered within this state.
The Commerce Clause and the Import-Export Clause present two independent,
although admittedly related issues. In the Richfield Oil case, the Supreme Court stated:
The two constitutional provisions, while related, are not conterminous. To be
sure, a state tax has at times been held unconstitutional both under the ImportExport Clause and under the Commerce Clause. But there are important differences between the two. The invalidity of one derives from the prohibition of
the import or export; the validity of the other turns nowise on whether the article
was, or had ever been, an import or export.
329 U.S. at 75 (1946). Although the Court determined that the Washington business and occupation tax as applied to the activity was not violative of either Clause, this paper will be
limited to the Import-Export Clause portions of the decision.
5 U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 10, Cl. 2. "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by the
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and
all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress."
' See, e.g., Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 90 (1937); Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); where the Supreme Court held
that an excise tax, measured by gross receipts, applied to the stevedoring business, was
violative of Commerce Clause despite the fact that all of the activities were conducted
within one state. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Carter and Weekes, felt
that the tax was not violative of the Commerce Clause but did violate the Import-Export
Clause. His determination was based on the well accepted principle that the Import-Export
Clause prohibited any tax applied to an import or export or their processes. 330 U.S. at
444-45.
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Washington issued a declaratory judgement invalidating Revised
Rule 193, Part D, to the extent that it applied to stevedoring
operations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The court
rested its decision on the precedent set by the Stevedoring
Cases.! Petitioner, the Washington Department of Revenue, appealed the decision to the Washington Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court, after accepting certification, affirmed the lower
court decision,8 again citing the Stevedoring Cases. The two
dissenting justices found no Import-Export Clause infringement
because the exaction was applied to the activity of handling the
goods and not imposed directly upon the goods themselves. They
would, however, have considered the application of the tax to
stevedoring itself violative of the Commerce Clause. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of the possible
impact on the issues made by the intervening decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)."' Held, the
Washington business and occupation tax as applied to stevedoring
was not violative of the Commerce Clause or the Import-Export
Clause of the Constitution. Under the Import-Export Clause, only
exactions that amount to Imports or Duties cannot be applied to
exports or the exportation process. Department of Revenue of
State of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
Prior to 1976, the Import-Export Clause was construed to prohibit any and all taxes applied to imports or exports or upon the
importing or exporting processes."0 Once a good gained status as
The Superior Court, with noteworthy candor stated:
It would seem to the Court .. .that there certainly is a swing away from the
Puget Sound and Carter and Weekes cases ....
It sticks in this Court's mind, however, that there has to be a reason, of which
is beyond the ability of this Court to comprehend, that everyone has shied from
the stevedoring cases, and many minds obviously more brilliant than mine have
not been able to overturn those cases directly in thirty-eight years .... Under
those circumstances the Court does hold that the Puget Sound and Carter and
Weekes cases are the law of the land, as exemplified by those decisions; that they
have not been reversed by implication, nor has there been a invitation to anyone
to reverse those cases.
559 P.2d 997, 88 Wash. 2d 315 (1977).
435 U.S. at 743; see also Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a
More Unified Approach to ConstitutionalAdjudication? 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426, 1441-1446
(1977); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION at 286-288 (4th ed.
1978).
10 435 U.S. at 752. See also Rictfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69, 76 (1946);
Joseph v. Carter and Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 445 (1947). The Surpeme Court
has consistently held that once an item was deemed an import or export, the item and its
processes were immune from any type of exaction, discriminatory or otherwise.
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an import or export a blanket immunity extended to the goods
themselves and to the process of transporting the goods."
The Import-Export Clause was designed to insure protection to
the landlocked States from the threat of selective privilege taxes
imposed by the seaboard States upon goods passing through their
borders." The Framers of the Constitution had three main objectives in mind when they drafted the Import-Export Clause." First,
and foremost, the Framers were aware of the necessity of
establishing effective foreign policy controls for the federal
government. It was paramount that control be vested exclusively
in the federal government to assure uniformity and predictability.
Second, the Framers were concerned with maintaining sufficient
Federal revenues. At the time, it was believed that import duties
would account for a majority of the national revenue. Finally, the
Framers were aware of the necessity of avoiding disputes among
the States both commercially and politically.
The seminal case interpreting the Clause in the area of exports
is Coe v. ErroL" In Coe the Supreme Court sustained an ad
valorem property tax levied on a shipment of spruce logs stored in
New Hampshire and intended to be floated down the Androscoggin River for eventual processing and sale in Maine. Although this
case involved an attack under the Commerce Clause, the Court
nevertheless established criteria for determining export immunity. The Court's holding indicated that mere intent to export
without any physical movement was insufficient to invoke immunity under the Import-Export Clause. Mr. Justice Bradley, in
upholding the exaction stated:
[Sluch goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered
with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or
have been started upon such transportation in a continuous
route or journey."
" See note 5 supr.
12 For a more detailed historical account of the Import-Export Clause see generally THE

FEDERALIST Nos. 15-22 (A. Hamilton); Note, State Taxation of Exports: The Stream of Constitutionality, 54 N.C. L. REV. 59, 59-65 (1975).
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 555-56 (1959); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 471 U.S. 566, 574 (1978); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-286 (1976).
' 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
1 116 U.S. at 527.
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The prerequisite of some movement was to insure that the articles would not be returned to the United States. This conclusion
was given further support by the fact that the court would also
recognize export immunity for articles committed to a common
carrier despite the fact that physical motion was lacking. Coe exemplifies the principle that immunity from taxation "attaches to
the export and not to the article before its exportation."' 6
The next case of major significance in the export immunity area
was A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards." This case involved a
challenge of a New York sales tax imposed on the sale of baseballs
and bats to a Venezuelan company with a New York purchasing
agent. In quashing the levy, the Supreme Court held that actual
delivery of the goods to the Venezuelan ship constituted a significant step in the exportation process, thus activating the immunity
of the Import-Export Clause. The holding made a clear distinction
between goods qualifying for the immunity and those merely intended for future export and therefore subject to taxation by the
State. The Court's opinion was consistent with Coe to the extent
that committment to a common carrier was considered sufficient
to insure immunity. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority
stated:
The very act that passed the title and that would have incurred the tax had the transaction been domestic, committed the
goods to the carrier that was to take them across the sea, for
the purpose of export and with the direction to the foreign port
upon the goods. The fact that further acts were to be done
before the goods would set to sea does not matter so long as
they were only regular steps to the contemplated result. '
Once again, in 1946, the Supreme Court decided a case with a
claim of export immunity in Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board."
In Richfield, the taxpayer sold a quantity of oil to a New Zealand
vessel and California tax authorities attempted to impose a sales
tax on the transaction. The Supreme Court held that the delivery
of the oil to the export bound ships "marked the commencement
of the movement of the oil abroad,"' ' thereby invoking the immunity of the Import-Export Clause. The main consideration in
" Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904).
" 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
, Id. at 69-70.
329 U.S. 69 (1946).
Id.
at 83.
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the determination of the status of the oil as an export was the
"certainty that the goods [were] headed to sea."21 Richfield was
the case placing the greatest emphasis on "certainty for export"
as a factor in establishing immunity under the Import-Export
Clause. The tax was struck down despite the fact that it was not
directly applied to the goods themselves. Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court stated: "The prohibition contained in the
Import-Export Clause against taxation on exports clearly invokes
more that a mere exemption from taxes laid specifically upon the
exported goods themselves."'' The Court was unequivocal in its
determination that the Import-Export Clause prohibited any and
all taxes on imports, exports, or their processes without congressional approval. Applying the familiar doctrine of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius, the Court concluded that since the Clause
contained one express exception to immunity no other exception
was intended.23 Richfield also endorsed the holding in Brown v.
Maryland21 that a tax on the sale of an article amounts to a tax on
the article itself. Thus the immunity of an article was to be wholly
dependent on its status as an export.
Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Richfield stressed the
importance of defining the precise point at which an article was
'1

Id. at 82.
Id at 85.
See note 5 supra.
As to imports the Court concluded:

All must perceive, that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a
tax on the article itself. It is true, the State may tax occupations generally, but
this tax must be paid by those who employ the individual, or be a tax on his
business. The lawyer, the physician, or the mechanic, must either charge
more on the article in which he deals, or the thing itself is taxed through
his person. This the State has a right to do, because no constitutional prohibition
extends to it. So, a tax on the occupation of an importer is, in a like manner, a tax
on importation. It must add to the price of the article, an be paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the article
itself would be made. This the State has not the right to do, because it is prohibited by the constitution.
As to exports the Court concluded:
The States are forbidden to lay a duty on exports, and the United States are forbidden to lay a tax or a duty on articles exported from any state. There is some
diversity in language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited.
The United States have the same right to tax occupation which is possessed
by the States. Now, suppose the United States should require every exporter to take out a license for which he should pay such tax as Congress might
think proper to impose; would government be permitted to shield itself from the
just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the constitution
would expose it, by saying, that this was a tax on the person, not on the article,
and that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?
12 Wheat 419, 444 (1827).
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deemed an export. The significance of the distinction was attributed to the fact that the Constitution did not intend to relieve
exports from any prior tax burdens levied on like articles.5 He
felt that the majority exposition would result in immunizing all exactions once an article acquired export status, and would thus act
to 'not only grant tax immunity to many profitable businesses
which share governmental protections from payment of their fair
part of taxes; it also throws an unfair part of the tax burden on
others."" Black asserted that the sales tax was imposed on a transaction occuring prior to the point at which the oil became an export. He therefore concluded that the policy behind the immunity,
to protect inland States from selective and discriminatory taxation by the seaboard States, was not served by immunizing a
wholly intrastate sale. "It was not intended to bestow a bounty of
blanket tax immunity upon all those who engaged in the production, processing, purchase, or sale of goods shipped abroad. '",
Black considered that the excise tax was the quid pro quo for the
use and enjoyment of California's services and protections.
The Court made a slight revision in the "physical movement"
doctrine in the case of Empresa Siderurgica v. County of
Merced,2 which sustained the imposition of a California ad
valorem property tax on a portion of a cement factory sold and
prepared for shipment to Columbia, South America. Twelve percent of the factory had been shipped to Columbia prior to the imposition of the tax. California taxed the remaining eighty-eight
percent remaining on tax day in the United States, some of which
was dismantled and packaged for shipment. Despite the fact that
the seller had obtained an export license, the sale was finalized,
and the goods were virtually certain to be exported, the Court per
Justice Douglas, upheld the validity of the property tax:
It is not enough that there is an intent to export, or a plan which
contemplates exportation, or an integrated series of events
which will end with it.... It is the entrance of the articles into
the export stream that marks the start of the process of exportation. Then there is certainty that the goods are headed for
their foreign destination and will not be diverted to domestic
use. Nothing less will suffice."
329 U.S. at 86.
lId. at 87.
Id at 89.
337 U.S. 154 (1949).
I& at 155-57.
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This decision indicated a rejection of the "certainty for export"
doctrine, motivated by concern that the article in question would
some how find their way back to the domestic market. The Court
applied a purely mechanical test of "physical movement" to mark
the precise point at which an article will attain export immunity
pursuant to the Import-Export Clause.
The doctrine of "certainty for export" was finally laid to rest in
1974 in Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.' In Kosydar, the
Supreme Court sustained an Ohio ad valorem property tax levied
on N.C.R. cash registers stored in an Ohio warehouse awaiting
shipment out of the United States. Although this decision was
quite consistent with previous rulings, there were some additional
facts worthy of comment. The cash registers were custom designed
to the peculiar specification of the foreign purchasers. N.C.R.
asserted that the unique design of the machines, which rendered
them useless in the United States, coupled with the virtual certainty that the goods were to be exported, mandated immunity.'
In sustaining the tax, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote: "Consequently,
the essential question in cases involving the Clause is a narrow
one: is the property upon which a tax has been sought to be imposed
an 'export,' and thus entitled to protection under the provision's
' In defining tests for determining
literal terms?"82
when an article
becomes an export, the Court reviewed the previous cases from
Coe to Empresa, and observed that "the essential problem in
cases involving the constitutional prohibition against taxation of
exports has therefore been to decide whether a sufficient commencement of the process of exportation has occured so as to immunize the article at issue from State taxation."" The Court could
not find any material distinction between the case sub judice and
the Empresa case. In both fact situations the articles were
awaiting shipment when the exaction was levied. Additionally,
there had been no commencement of the export process, nor were
the 'goods in transit. Despite N.C.R.'s allegation that the registers
were certain to be exported, the Court could find no distinction
between the cash registers and the part of the cement plant
dismantled and packaged for shipment in Empresa. The various
contingencies which might arise prior to exportation (the orders
417 U.S. 62 (1974).
&ILat 64, n. 3.
Id at 66.
Id. at 67.
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could be cancelled, the export permit might not be granted, or the
machines might be destroyed or utilized as scrap) reduced the
alleged certainty that the goods would be exported. But even if
the goods were "certain for export," they would nevertheless be
subject to taxation because they were in the warehouse on tax
day. Citing Joy Oi the Court concluded: "The Import-Export
Clause was meant to confer immunity upon property being exported, not to relieve property eventually to be exported from its
''
share of the cost of local services. 3
The Kosydar opinion recognized the policy considerations
underlying the Import-Export Clause. The Clause was not designed
to benefit exporters or to relieve from taxation those who merely
happen to handle articles eventually exported. The Court adopted
the mechanical "movement test" to distinguish between exports
and those goods merely intended to be exported. Although this
test, by its very nature, was not definitive in scope, the Court
observed that "simplicity has its virtues." Utilizing the "movement test," the tax authorities could easily determine whether
specific goods would carry immunity under the Import-Export
Clause. On the other hand, the test might result in unfair taxation
of goods clearly for export, yet not in actual physical movement
due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties."
Kosydar was the last major Supreme Court case' involving a
claim of exort immunity prior to Washington Stevedoring. The
cases have clearly marked a trend to narrow the scope of immunity
under the Clause to conform with commercial considerations and
the ever declining usefulness of the Clause to achieve its original
objectives.N As of 1976, articles were immune from taxation only
SId. at 70.
"Id.
Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vinson in Empresa where he asserted that the
tax should be overturned because the delay was occasioned by circumstances beyond the
taxpayers control; intent alone should suffice to invoke the immunity of the Import-Export
Clause. 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
" But see, Connel Rice & Sugar Co. v. County of Yolo, 569 F2d 514 (9th Cir. 1978), where
the Court of Appeals sustained a California ad valorem property tax levied on rice stored in
Sacramento awaiting the arrival of shipping vessels for export transit. Although the rice
had been prepared for export and was virtually certain to be exported, the Court held the
goods taxable because they were in storage and had not begun their final journey to Japan.
The Court, in upholding the tax stated:
Moreover, a 'virtual certainty' of shipment to Japan evidenced by a financial and
contractual relationship fails to place the subject rice in the stream of commerce
so as to prevent taxation by the local authority.
569 F2d at 518.
3 See generally Comment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 15 (1966).
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if they qualified as "exports." The Kosydar test allowed immunity
when the goods entered the export stream, "the final and continuous journey out of the country." 9 Once a good was deemed to
have export status, the good itself and all associated processes, including its sale and transporation, were immune from any levy by
State or federal governments.
In 1976, the landmark case of Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages"2
reversed this long-standing position and held that the ImportExport Clause merely afforded a conditional ban against taxation
of imorts and importation processes. The Supreme Court sustained
the imposition of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
upon imported tires and tubes stored in a warehouse in Gwinnet
County, Georgia. In the import area, prior to Michelin, the status
of goods as imports was determined by application of the "original
package" doctrine," which granted complete immunity to imported goods retaining their original (foreign) packaging. Once the
goods were removed from this original package, they immediately
lost their status as imports and were freely amenable to taxation.
Michelin discarded the original package doctrine and adopted an
entirely different analysis, directed to the nature of the exaction
rather than that of the goods involved. Only those taxes that
amounted to imposts or duties fell within the scope of immunity
provided by the Import-Export Clause. Mr. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court, stated that, "nothing in the history of the
Import-Export Clause even remotely suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax which is also imposed on
imported goods that are no longer in import transit was the type
of exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the Framers."'"
In order to determine whether or not the exaction constituted
an impost or duty, the Court analyzed the tax to determine if it
violated any of the objectives underlying the Import-Export
Clause, and concluded in the negative." The Michelin holding was
in many respects consistent with the principles expressed by Mr.
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Richfield Oil. "[W]e
435 U.S. at 752.
423 U.S. 276 (1976); for a excellent exegesis on the Michelin decision see Hellerstein,
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev.
(1977).
" See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 370-71 (1978). See also note
40 supra.
U 423 U.S. at 286.
u See note 40 supra,at 107-113.
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should not invalidate such a tax unless satisfied beyond doubt that
it falls squarely and wholly within the area marked by the Constitution for tax exemption."" Under the Michelin approach no exaction could be applied to goods still in import transit, though the
Court was equivocal as to when transit status terminated."
Michelin dealt on its facts only with immunity claims as applied to
imports. Thus, until Washington Stevedoring there was no indication of any change in the export area.
In 1978, the Supreme Court, in the Washington Stevedoring
case, held that the Michelin approach was equally applicable in
the export area. Applying the Michelin analysis, the Court determined that the Washington business and occupation tax as applied
to stevedoring was not violative of any of the goals underlying the
Import-Export Clause and therefore did not constitute an impost
or a duty." The Court found no violation of the policy of maintaining the Federal government's ability to effectively conduct
foreign policy because the assessments were nondiscriminatory
and therefore did not constitute any special protective tariff." In
addition the tax was levied only on business activity conducted exclusively within the State and thus did not obstruct the regulation
of foreign commerce. The Court also concluded that the exaction
did not offend the second policy of the Framers, to insure a sufficient source of federal import revenues. Following the same
reasoning applied in Michelin, the Court held that the exaction
was merely a quid pro quo for the benefits conferred by the State
and therefore did not divert funds from the federal coffers." In
any case, a prohibition from taxation of exports would have no effect on federal revenues because the Constitution forbids any
federal taxation of exports. 9 Finally, the goal of preventing interstate friction was not involved because so long as the Commerce Clause requirements were satisfied, there would be no
cause for dissention between the States.' Mr. Justice Blackmun,
representing the majority observed: "Requiring coastal States to
" 329 U.S. at 87.
" See note 40 supra, at 122-26.
"

435 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 753.

Id. at 758.
The Commerce Clause requires that the exaction be related to the service and protection offered by the State. Further, the Clause requires the tax to be fairly apportioned and
nondiscriminatory. Any tax that satisfies these requirements cannot cause friction between
the States. Id. at 754.
"
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subsidize the commerce of inland customers may well exacerbate,
rather than diminish, rivalries and hostility." 51 The Court concluded
that since the exaction did not violate any of the underlying purposes of the Import-Export Clause, it did not fall within the imposts or duties prohibited by the Clause.
The Court acknowledged, in passing, two major factual distinctions between Washington Stevedoring and Michelin. Michelin indicated that the goods taxed there were no longer in import transit52 and specifically stated that if the goods had been in transit,
the Import-Export Clause would have prohibited even a nondiscriminatory property tax. But in Washington Stevedoring the
exaction was applied while the articles were still in transit.
Secondly, the tax was applied to the handling of the goods in the
Washington Stevedoring case, whereas in Michelin the tax was imposed directly on the goods themselves. Nevertheless, the Court
claimed that the exaction would not constitute an impost or duty if it
was applied to the handling of the goods whether or not they were
still in transit." In order to reconcile these distinctions the Court
made reference to the 1951 case of CantonR. Co. v. Rogan," which
sustained the imposition of a Maryland franchise tax, measured by
gross receipts, upon a railroad operating exclusively within the
State. The railroad alleged immunity because almost half of its income resulted from the transport of imports and exports. In
upholding the tax, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
The difference is that in the present case the tax is not on the
goods but on the handling of them at port. An article may be an
export and immune from tax long before or after it reaches the
port. But when the tax is on activities connected with the export
or import the range of immunity cannot be so wide."
The Canton opinion never addressed the application of the tax to
stevedoring because the record of the case indicated that the
railroad merely leased the loading crane and therefore did not
engage in stevedoring activities.' The Court concluded that the
I&
d. at 760.

423 U.S. at 302.
"98 U.S. at 758.
340 U.S. 511 (1951).
Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
In concluding that the Court did not reach the application of the tax to stevedoring, Mr.
Justice Douglas said:
We do not conclude, however, that any activity more remote than that does not

commence the movement of the commodities abroad nor end their arrival and
therefore is not a part of the export or import process.
Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
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railroad's activities preceded and were not a part of the actual import or export processes immune from taxation.
The Court in Washington Stevedoring, finding no economic
distinction between the case at bar and the Canton decision, concluded: ". . . the Michelin policy analysis should not be discarded
merely because the goods are in transit, at least where the taxation falls upon a service distinct from the goods and their value."5 7
Respondents offered three arguments in support of their contention that the exaction was prohibited under the Clause. First,
respondents asserted that the Import-Export Clause was an absolute ban on all taxation.' The Court rejected this assertion on
grounds that Michelin construed the Import-Export Clause as a
mere conditional ban against imposts and duties. Furthermore,
construction of the Clause as an absolute ban would render many
of the terms in Article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution
superfluous.5 9
Secondly, respondents contended that in Michelin the tax was
applied to articles deemed a part of the general mass of property,
whereas in Washington Stevedoring the tax was levied on goods
remaining in transit. The Court recognized that the alleged distinction rested upon the status of the goods rather than upon the
status of the tax as an impost or duty.
Finally, respondents alleged that the exaction was in effect a
transit fee applied to inland consumers in violation of the ImportExport Clause. The Court dismissed this argument concluding
that the exaction was merely the quid pro quo for services and
protection provided to the stevedoring business by the State of
Washington.
Mr. Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion, agreeing that the Washington business and occupation tax as applied to
stevedoring did not constitute an impost or duty within the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause, and also conceding that the
levey did not result in a transit fee upon inland consumers. But
Powell disagreed with the majority's reasoning in determining
98 U.S. at 757.
"

Id at 759.

Finally, to conclude that "Imports or Duties" encompasses all taxes makes
superfluous several of the terms of Art. I, § 9, Cl. 1 of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the "Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises."
In particular the Framers apparently did not include "Excises," such as an exaction
on the privilege of doing business, within the scope of "Imposts or Duties."
435 U.S. at 759.

GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.

[Vol. 9:457

that the tax was not of the type prohibited even by Michelin." He
argued that the majority improperly resurrected the "directindirect" test by distinguishing between a tax applied directly on
goods and a tax imposed on handling of goods. 1 Powell regarded
the distinction as artificial in that a tax based on some criterion
distinct from the value of the goods could still amount to a selective transit fee. Nonetheless, he concluded that the exaction was
not among those prohibited by the Clause because it was a quid
pro quo for benefits provided by the State and was not imposed
merely for the privilege of moving through the State.2
The Supreme Court's approval of the Michelin analysis for application in the export area as well as the import area will require
considerable adjustment by affected parties. Previous decisions
were consistent in forbidding the imposition of any levy nondiscriminatory or otherwise, upon export articles or export processes." If one applied the Michelin approach to exports, the initial inquiry would appear to be whether the tax amounts to an impost or duty, regardless of export status. However, due to the
peculiar nature of exports, the practical effect of Washington
Stevedoring will not be as expansive as one might conclude. The
determinative inquiry will continue to be whether the goods have
entered the "export stream, the final, continuous journey out of
the country." The Supreme Court has consistently determined
that export goods gain no immunity until they begin their journey
in export transit. However, under Michelin, even a nondiscriminatory charge would be prohibited if the goods were in
transit. The distinction lies in the natural differences between import and export items. An item can gain the status of an import
without being in transit. Thus it appears that the Michelin decision was an attempt to reconcile the area of import immunity with
the principles of export immunity to the extent that no taxation
was permitted on imports or the import processes once transit
begins.
SId. at 763. Recall that even a nondiscriminatory tax should be prohibited on goods shall
in import transit under the Michelin approach. Mr. Justice Brennan said, "A nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously stands on a different footing, and to the extent there is any conflict whatsoever with this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods which
are merely in transit through the State when the tax is assessed." 423 U.S. at 290 (footnote
omitted).
" Id. at 762.
Id. at 764.
" See note 10 supra.
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The important distinction between Michelin and Washington
Stevedoring was that the tax in the latter case was applied not to
the goods themselves, but to the handling of the goods. The majority in Washington Stevedoring expressly noted that they did
not address the application of the Michelin approach to a tax applied on goods still in import or export transit." It therefore appears that the most significant impact of Washington Stevedoring
was the upholding of a nondiscriminatory excise tax applied upon
a service distinct from the goods while they were in export and
import transit. This result may not appear to be innovative in
light of the Canton decision that permitted the taxation of income
derived from railroad services incidental to the importing and exporting of goods. However, Canton clearly defined the railroad's
activity as one preceding the actual process of exportation. The
Court was well aware that the processes of exportation were immune from taxation under the Clause. It was perhaps noteworthy
that the Court in Washington Stevedoring found no economic
distinction between the railroad's activity and the activity of
stevedoring companies." There is no indication that the Supreme
Court would sustain a nondiscriminatory exaction applied directly
on goods that are in import or export transit." However, one may
be more confident in concluding that Washington Stevedoring will
modify the Michelin decision to the extent that a nondiscriminatory tax applied to a service distinct from the goods
would be upheld even if the goods were in export or import transit.
Powell's concurring opinion appears to carry the State's ability
to tax imports and exports one step further. Powell felt the tax
was justified, not because it was levied on the handling of the
goods, but because the tax was the quid pro quo for services and
protections proffered by the State. He agreed with the conclusion
in Michelin that the Import-Export Clause was only designed to
prohibit taxes that were merely exactions for the privilege of
moving through a State."7 In view of Powell's analysis, perhaps in
the future a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned ad valorem property tax may be upheld if it can be shown that the tax merely compensates the State for services rendered.

"

435 U.S. 757, n. 23.
Id. at 757.
This outcome is consistent with the analysis contained in note 40 supra at 131-132.
See note 62 supra.
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Washington Stevedoring appears to be generally consistent
with the original considerations underlying the Import-Export
Clause. No one would contend that the decision permitted the imposition of a discriminatory transit fee for the privilege of moving
goods through the State. The Court was unequivocal in deciding
that the Clause was intended to prohibit only such taxes as constituted imposts or duties from being applied to exports or imports. To hold otherwise would result in an inequitable tax burden
on non importing/exporting taxpayers. It would force these concerns with purely domestic operations to "pick up the tab" for
benefits provided by the State to import/export businesses. This
shift in tax burden was clearly not the intent of the Framers in
drafting the Import-Export Clause. As the Court in Michelin indicated, "there is no reason why an importer should not bear his
share of these costs along with his competitors handling only
domestic goods."" The Court in Washington Stevedoring has carried this concept one step further by permitting a nondiscriminatory excise tax to be applied to the processes of importation and exportation even while the goods are still in transit.
There are many who feel that the Import-Export Clause has
become somewhat obsolete." As a result of the numerous
technological advances in the field of transportation, such as large
capacity freight airplanes and the like, goods being transported
by the inland States will not fall amenable to the taxing power of
the coastal States as the goods will no longer have to cross State
lines in order to reach their foreign destination. In addition, levies
that comply with the Commerce Clause requirements" a fortiori
423 U.S. at 287.
u See Note, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1054, 1061 (1976).
' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the possible impact on
the issues made by the intervening decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977). In Complete Auto Transit, the Supreme Court upheld a Mississippi excise tax on
the privilege of doing business in the State against a challenge under the Commerce Clause.
The Court found no such violation primarily because of the nature of the tax. First, the Court
found a substantial nexus between the activities of the taxpayer and the State of Mississippi.
Second, the tax was fairly apportioned, that is the measure of the tax was based on the
amount of activity conducted within the State. Third, the Court determined that the tax did
not discriminate against interstate commerce as there was no possibility of multiple tax
burdens on the taxpayer. Finally, the tax was reasonably related to the services provided by
the State. For a more detailed account of Complete Auto Transit and the Commerce Clause
area, see Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Courk"Toward a More Unified Approach to ConstitutionalAdjudication?75 MICH. L. REV. 1426, 1441-1446 (1977); J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN. STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION at 286-288 (4th ed. 1978).
Essentially, any tax that can withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause by definition
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will not constitute selectively imposed, discriminatory privilege
taxes that the Framers of the Import-Export Clause sought to
prohibit.
Tony G. Mills
would not amount to the type of tax feared by the Framers. Therefore, an exaction satisfying
the Commerce Clause should not violate the Import-Export Clause as it has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court. But the Court has not addressed the issue of a properly apportioned,
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax levied on imports or exports. Although there is no indication that such a tax would be upheld, a consistent trend of the Court's decisions would appear
to eventually sustain such a tax if in fact the Commerce Clause requirements were met.

